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RECENT DECISIONS
Statute Requiring Period of Residency
for Receipt of Welfare Benefits Held
Violative of the Equal Protection
Clause
In July 1966, plaintiffs, husband and
wife, moved to Delaware in order to
facilitate the husband's attempts to find
work as a construction laborer. There-
after, he found employment with suc-
cessive contractors but, due to bad
weather and lay-offs, he averaged less than
forty dollars a week to support his family
of nine. Plaintiffs were granted public
assistance by the state in December 1966,
but this aid was discontinued when it was
discovered that they had not fulfilled the
state's one year statutory residency re-
quirement. After exhausting their admin-
istrative remedies, plaintiffs brought a
class action in the federal courts seeking
a declaratory judgment that the residency
provisions of the statute were unconstitu-
tional and for an injunction against
their enforcement. In granting plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, the United
States District Court of Delaware held
that the residency provisions of the
welfare law violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment in
that they created an invidious discrimina-
tion against individuals who had not
fulfilled the residency requirement of the
state. Green v. Department of Public
Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del.
1967).
Statutory distinctions between residents
and non-residents have often been em-
ployed by the states in order to preserve
certain benefits for their own residents by
excluding or discouraging non-residents
from participation in certain activities.
Since the initial statutory discriminations
were basically concerned with property
rights, the early attacks upon such dis-
tinctions concerned themselves with the
privileges and immunities clause and the
commerce clause of the Constitution. For
example, in Ward v. Maryland,1 the
Supreme Court considered the validity of
a Maryland law which required that
traders within that state be licensed and
which inflicted certain criminal penalties
upon non-residents who failed to comply.
Under the statute, the cost of a license
for a resident varied from twelve to one
hundred fifty dollars, depending upon the
value of his stock, whereas the cost of a
license for a non-resident was three hun-
dred dollars annually. Petitioner, a non-
resident of Maryland, was convicted of
violating this provision and fined the
minimum penalty of four hundred dollars.
In reversing the conviction, the Court
noted that although the states have the
power to tax stock within the state
belonging to both resident and non-
resident merchants, it felt that the Mary-
land statute was an unreasonable dis-
crinination against non-residents and,
hence, violative of the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV, section 2
because, at the very least, this clause
means the right to be secure in the pursuit
of commerce without molestation. Further,
the Court stated that, if the states were
permitted to promulgate such measures,
Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce would soon become valueless.
In McCready v. Virginia,2 the Supreme
Court considered a Virginia statute
which prohibited non-residents from
planting oysters in the soil covered by her
tidewaters. Petitioner had violated this
statute and been fined. The Court held
that since the law merely regulated the
use of property owned by the people of
179 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
294 U.S. 391 (1876).
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Virginia in common, the privileges and im-
munities clause was inapplicable because
that clause did not invest citizens of one
state with any interest in the common
property of citizens of another state.
The Court found that there was no real
question presented with regard to the
commerce clause, since commerce "has
nothing to do with land while producing,
but only with the product after it has
become the subject of trade." 3
Seventy-two years later, the scope of the
McCready rule was limited by Toomer
v. Witsell.4  This case involved certain
South Carolina statutes which set up a
license fee of twenty five dollars for each
shrimp boat owned by a resident and
$2,500 for one owned by a non-resident
and which required persons shrimping
within the three-mile maritime belt to
dock at a South Carolina port to unload,
pack and stamp their catch before ship-
ping or transporting it to another state.
In discussing the privileges and immunities
clause, the Supreme Court indicated that
such clause did not preclude disparity
between residents and non-residents where
such discrimination was based upon valid
independent reasons. However, the Court.
established the criterion that, notwith-
standing the existence of such reasons,
the privileges and immunities clause would
be violated if the resultant discrimination
was not reasonably related to the legiti-
mate harm intended to be prevented by
the statute. Applying this standard,
the Court held that although the state
had a legitimate interest in protecting its
natural resources, the degree of discrimi-
3Id. at 396.
4334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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nation used against non-residents was not
reasonably related to the purposes sought
to -be achieved. The McCready case was
referred to as an exception to the con-
stitutional mandate of the privileges and
immunities clause and distinguishable
upon two grounds. In McCready, the
state had more control over the oysters,
since they would remain within its borders
until removed by man, while the shrimp
involved in Toomer were only in South
Carolina territory temporarily. Further-
more, the former case involved inland
water restrictions while the latter con-
cerned restrictions on the open sea.5 With
regard to the South Carolina statute re-
quiring the shrimp boats to dock in that
state, the Court held that, since that
procedure increased the costs of non-
resident fishermen who would normally
take their catch directly to a neighboring
state, the enactment was an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter believed that
the majority had misapplied the meaning
of the privileges and immunities clause
and would have based the decision solely
on the commerce clause, since he felt
that the privileges and immunities clause
was not "meant to obliterate all special
relations between a State and its citi-
zens" I and must be read in light of the
tenth amendment.
Although many of the older decisions
involving property concepts were decided
5 The Court cited United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 (1947), for the proposition that
"neither the thirteen original colonies nor their
successor States separately acquired 'ownership'
of the three-mile belt." Id. at 31.
6 334 U.S. at 408 (concurring opinion).
under the commerce and privileges
clauses of the Constitution, the more
modern statutes restricting personal rights
and liberties have often included argu-
ments under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. One of
the most common types of statutes in-
volving personal rights are those which
impose residency requirements in the area
of voting legislation. For example, Car-
rington v. Rash 7 involved a provision of
the Texas Constitution which provided
that a serviceman living in that state was
required to vote only in the county where
he resided at the time of entry into the
service." Petitioner, an Army sergeant
from Alabama, entered the service in
1946. In 1962, he moved to El Paso,
Texas, purchased a house and established
a small business. The Texas Supreme
Court refused petitioner's petition for a
writ of mandamus which would have
ordered local election officials to allow
him to vote in Texas. The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the
decision, holding that the provision vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court began
its analysis by asserting that a state "has
unquestioned power to impose reason-
able residence restrictions on the avail-
ability of the ballot."9 However, what is
reasonable will depend, not upon whether
members of a class drawn by a state law
are treated equally, but upon the rela-
tionship the classification bears to the
7380 U.S. 89 (1965).
8 TEXAS CONST. art. VI, § 2.
9380 U.S. at 91.
purpose of the legislation.' 0 In defense
of the statute, respondent presented two
primary purposes to support the classifi-
cation. First, it was argued that the state
sought to prevent a possible situation in
which an organized bloc vote by mili-
tary personnel would subordinate the
voice of the civilian community. Second,
the state, by means of the statute in
question, sought to shield local voting
rights from infiltration by transients. The
Court ruled that the first alleged purpose
was invalid in itself, since a state could
not withhold the right to vote due to a
fear of how that right would be exer-
cised. As to the second legislative goal,
the Court felt that since the statute
denied a soldier the opportunity to suc-
cessfully controvert the presumption of
non-residence, it imposed an invidious
discrimination in violation of the four-
teenth amendment. 1
Legislation establishing residency re-
quirements applicable to recipients of
welfare benefits faced constitutional at-
tack as early as the 1940 case of Matter
of Chirillo.12 The case involved a New
10Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause . . . does not end with a
showing of equal application among the
members of the class defined by the legisla-
tion. The courts must reach and determine
the question whether the classifications drawn
in a statute are reasonable in light of its
purpose. . . . McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
1 380 U.S. at 96. The dissenting opinion felt
that since the categories of servicemen and
transients were synonymous in most cases, there
existed a rational classification even though the
provision would disenfranchise bona fide voters
in some cases.
12283 N.Y. 417, 28 N.E.2d 895 (1940).
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York statute's which provided for the re-
moval of non-resident poor who were
being supported by the state, to another
state in which someone was willing to
lend support to the removed person. Al-
though the majority of the Court of Ap-
peals dismissed upon a technical point re-
lating to the formulation of the appeal,'
14
the three dissenting judges discussed the
relevant constitutional questions. They felt
that the Court should have affirmed the
order holding the statute valid under the
state's police power. The challenge under
the commerce clause was dismissed with
the statement that, absent congressional
action, the state may, via its police
power, act even though there was some
interference with interstate commerce. 15
As for the claims of privileges and
immunities clause of article IV, section
2, and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the dissent indi-
cated that since the law affected all per-
sons similarly situated in a like fashion,
the provisions were not violated. 8 It
also felt that there was no validity to a
due process challenge because when New
York had joined the Union, it still re-
tained its police powers, which included
1: N.Y. PUB. WELFARE LAW § 71.
"'N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 588(3) allowed direct
appeal to the Court of Appeals where the only
issue involved in the case was the constitution-
ality of a state or federal statute. Here, the
majority felt that interpretation of the statute
was in question and hence dismissed the
appeal. Now, CPLR §5601(b)(2).
15 283 N.Y. at 435, 28 N.E.2d at 903 (dissent-
ing opinion). See Clauson v. Indiana, 306 U.S.
439 (1939); Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306
U.S. 79 (1939); Plumbley v. Massachusetts,
155 U.S. 461 (1894).
16 283 N.Y. at 436-37, 28 N.E.2d at 904.
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the right to deport all persons not legally
present.17
Another early case concerning this
problem involved an Illinois statute which
required that a welfare recipient reside in
the jurisdiction furnishing aid for the
three years immediately preceding his ap-
plication. 18 Here, the petitioners had ful-
filled the statutory prerequisite, except that
during the three year time limitation, they
had each spent short periods of time
elsewhere seeking employment. In sus-
taining the defendants' demurrer, the Il-
linois Supreme Court concluded that the
statute did not violate the due process
and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment and was a valid exer-
cise of the state's police power. It rea-
soned that the purpose of the statute was
to prevent the state from becoming a
haven for the transient poor and, there-
fore, the classification drawn by the
statute was not unreasonable in light of
this purpose.
In 1941, the United States Supreme
Court heard, for the first time, a case in-
volving one of the elements of residency
requirements and indigents. In Edwards
v. California,9 the petitioner was con-
victed under a statute which made it a
misdemeanor to bring into the state a
non-resident known to be indigent. The
Court, while acknowledging that the
states may to some extent affect inter-
state commerce, held that the statute was
not a valid exercise of the police power
and that it imposed an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce. The
17Id. at 432-34, 28 N.E.2d at 901.
1sPeople ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374
I11. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940).
1'9314 U.S. 160 (1941).
Court reasoned that since the transporta-
tion of human beings falls within the pro-
tection of the commerce clause, the Cali-
fornia statute effectively reduced the
possibility of the free flow of transients. 20
Mr. Justice Douglas chose to support his
concurring opinion on the belief that an
individual's right to interstate travel was
"an incident of national citizenship pro-
tected by the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against state interference.
21
Recently, there appears to have been
an upsurge of litigation concerning the
right of a state to place a residency re-
quirement as a prerequisite to the suc-
cessful attainment of welfare benefits. It
should be noted that since the Edwards
decision was the first United States Su-
preme Court pronouncement in an area
analogous to the present situation, it is
important as a guide to petitioners in the
formulation of their constitutional argu-
ments, although it is easily distinguishable
upon its facts. For example, in Harrell
v. Board of Commissioners ,22 decided in
1967, the District Court for the District
of Columbia considered an application
for the convening of a three-judge court
in an action to enjoin the enforcement of
an act which required that an individual
seeking welfare benefits reside in the Dis-
20 Id. at 172-73. See Mitchell v. United States,
313 U.S. 80 (1941); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
21The decision in this case was without
dissent. The majority (5) of the Court based
its decision on the commerce clause, while
four justices decided on the ground of the
privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
22 269 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967).
trict of Columbia for one year preceding
the filing of the application. 23 In denying the
application, the court ruled that no sub-
stantial constitutional question was raised,
since the residence requirement was a
reasonable restriction which Congress was
empowered to make. In support of its
conclusion, the court expressed a fear
that in the absence of a residence re-
quirement the District of Columbia might
become a "Mecca" for indigents, especial-
ly because of the generous payments
made there. The court considered a vio-
lation of the right to travel "too far-
fetched and remote to justify extended
discussion. ' ' 24 This case is distinguishable
from Edwards in that here the court was
not concerned with the bringing in of in-
digents to the District of Columbia but
the problem of how long they should be
there to obtain welfare aid.
Three days prior to the decision in the
Harrell case, the United States District
Court for Connecticut passed upon the
constitutionality of a somewhat similar state
statute in Thompson v. Shapiro.25 In
June 1966, plaintiff moved from Massa-
chusetts, where she had been receiving
certain welfare benefits, to Connecticut,
to live closer to her relatives. In Novem-
ber, plaintiff's request for public assis-
tance was denied since she had not ful-
filled the statutory residence require-
ment.26  In this action to declare the
statute unconstitutional, the court gave
judgment for plaintiff, ruling that the
statute had "a chilling effect on the right
23 D.C. CODE ANN. §3-203 (Supp. V 1966).
24 269 F. Supp. at 921.
25 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
26 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §17-2d (Supp.
1965).
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to travel" 27 and violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court noted that the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV, sec-
tion 2, was inapplicable to the case, since
"that clause only outlaws discrimination
by one state against citizens of another
state. 2 Since the Connecticut law ap-
plied to all applicants for public assis-
tance alike, the statute was valid under
this section. However, the court sus-
tained plaintiff's contention that the priv-
ileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment had been violated be-
cause, although the statute treated all
alike, it unduly restricted the vested right
to travel. Furthermore, the court found
that the residency requirement was a vio-
lation of the equal protection clause be-
cause the classifications drawn by the
statute were unreasonable. Defendant
had conceded that the purpose of the
statute was to protect the state finances
by discouraging an influx of indigents.
The court felt that this statutory classifi-
cation of newly arrived residents accord-
ing to the amount of money they brought
with them into the state was unreasonable
in light of the purpose of the statute,
since it was not proven that, in the long
run, newly-arrived indigents put more of
a burden on the state treasury than those
arriving with a cash stake or those with
one year's residence. 29 The dissent vigor-
ously maintained that the statute was a
valid legislative classification which the
state had the discretion and authority to
enact. It was argued that there was no
27 270 F. Supp. at 336.
28 d. at 334.
291 d. at 337-38.
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prohibition of travel between the states,
but merely deterrence of those who
would enter the state solely to receive its
liberal welfare benefits.30
In the instant case, plaintiffs had
moved into Delaware in July 1966. In
December 1966, the State granted plain-
tiffs public assistance, but this relief was
terminated when it was found that the
plaintiffs had not complied with the statu-
tory requirement of one year residency in
order to receive welfare. The plaintiffs
alleged that the residency requirement was
unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violated the due process clause, the equal
protection clause, and the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment and also infringed upon their
right to travel under the privileges and
immunities clause of article IV, section
2, and the commerce clause.
The Court first examined plaintiffs'
contentions with regard to the equal pro-
tection clause. At the outset, it was noted
that the equal protection clause did not
preclude all discrimination by a state but
only invidious discrimination. Therefore,
it was necessary for the plaintiffs to es-
tablish that the one year residency require-
ment did not bear any reasonable relation-
ship to the purpose of the statute.31 In
discussing the purpose of the provision,
the Court first looked to Delaware's Pub-
lic Assistance Code itself, which provided
that its function was:
to promote the welfare and happiness
of all people of the State, by providing
public assistance to all of its needy and
30d. at 339 (dissenting opinion).
31270 F. Supp. at 176; see generally Tussman
& ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALiF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
distressed; that assistance shall be ad-
ministered promptly and humanely with
due regard for the preservation of family
life .... 32
The Court concluded that the residency
requirement tended to frustrate, rather
than implement, the aim of the statute.
Since the aim of the statute was to sup-
port all people of the state, i.e., domi-
ciliaries, defined in Delaware common law
as one physically present with the intent to
remain indefinitely, the one year legis-
lative residency requirement was not an
objective test sufficient to establish the
requisite intent. And, since such a test
would deny the necessities of life to those
who were validly domiciled within the
state with the requisite intent, the statute
violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court noted
that there were more accurate alternatives
available to ascertain an individual's in-
tent "without exacting the protracted
waiting period with its dire economic and
social consequences. . . . -33 It should be
noted that the Court found it unnecessary
to reach the question of whether or ndt a
state could constitutionally restrict the
benefits of its own public welfare pro-
grams to its own domiciliaries. Finally,
the Court dismissed the defendant's asser-
tion that the statute's purpose was to dis-
courage the migration of indigents into
Delaware and thereby protect the public
purse. Citing Edwards, the Court an-
swered:
The protection of the public purse, no
matter how worthy in the abstract, is
not a permissible basis for differentiating
.- DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, §501 (1960).
33 270 F. Supp. at 178.
between persons who otherwise possess
the same status in their relationship to
the State of Delaware.3 4
Since the Court found that the Delaware
provisions were unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause, there was no
need for it to consider the plaintiffs' other
arguments.
The repercussions of the Green case
and other recently decided cases are far-
reaching. Initially, it is significant that, as
the dissent in the Thompson case pointed
out, forty states have some sort of resi-
dency requirement for receipt of welfare
benefits. 3 5 One of the reasons this legis-
lation is so widespread is that the Social
Security Act, in making grants to the
states for the support of needy families
with children, impliedly permits the states
to employ a residence requirement not
exceeding one year.36 Do the decisions
involving the Connecticut and Delaware
laws mean that these similar statutes of
the various states will also be held un-
constitutional? The answer to this ques-
tion will depend to some extent upon the
theory used to attack their validity. The
equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires a court first to ascer-
tain the purpose of the statute. The
court must then determine whether the
classification set up by the statute is rea-
sonably related to that purpose. Thus,
for any of the statutes to be upheld, they
34Id. at 177.
35Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331,
338-39 (D. Conn. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
States which do not have any waiting period
are Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine,
North Dakota, South Dakota, New York,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id. at 339 n. l(b).
36 76 Stat. 185, 188 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 602
(b) (1964).
14 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1968
must be found to isolate one factor ex-
clusively possessed by the persons classi-
fied, and this factor must be the object
aimed at by the laws. The only factor
possessed in common by the persons
classified under a residency statute is
length of residence, while there are sig-
nificant differences in other traits, es-
pecially intention to establish domicile
within the state. This one common fac-
tor, length of residence, would not appear
to be a sufficient basis for a state's denial
of welfare benefits under any purpose
that might be conceived. This would seem
so even in light of the fact that one of
the main purposes of a residency statute
is to prevent a fraud against the state.
The situation appears to be analogous
to one where a state asserts a residency
requirement to allow individuals within
its borders the right to vote in national
elections. The intent of such a require-
ment would be to identify the voter and
to assure that the individual voter is in
fact a member in the community and has
an interest in matters pertaining to the
government of the state.3 7  However, the
need for the necessities of life possesses an
immediacy which differentiates welfare
benefits from the right to vote. In light
of the urgency involved, it would seem
that some classification other than an
arbitrary residency requirement should be
established. Since the primary questions
with regard to the state are the issues of
intent and fraud in relation to welfare
expenditures, an alternative solution
would have to consider these elements.
7 Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721
(D. Md. 1964), agId per curiam, 380 U.S. 125
(1965) (equal protection argument dismissed).
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A possible solution to the problem may
be a more detailed examination of the
reasons a person entered into a state, any
attempts to find worthwhile job oppor-
tunities, whether any children are en-
rolled in the state educational system,
business opportunities attempted and other
factors. It would seem equitable under
these conditions to require an applicant
for aid to fill out certain forms and swear
to the truth of the statements.
Moreover, the argument that such laws
violate an individual's right to interstate
travel would not have such a consistent
result. If this claim is followed to its
natural conclusion, it will be noted that a
state will infringe upon the right to travel
in proportion to the amount of aid with-
held. In other words, a state providing
generous welfare benefits, by requiring
that the individual live within the state
a certain period of time before he can
take advantage of these state services,
will, hypothetically, hamper an indigent's
travel more than a state granting meager
benefits. As a result, while state statutes
such as those in Connecticut and Dela-
ware may be found to clearly violate this
right to travel, similar statutes enacted
by states which do not provide as gener-
ously may be declared to have a negli-
gible effect on this right.
One of the principal contentions of the
advocates of statutory residence require-
ments is that such laws prevent an influx
of indigents seeking more generous wel-
fare benefits. The merits of such an argu-
ment are speculative at best. One writer
has reported that "California which has
about the most stringent residence laws
in the country was second only to Florida
in attracting new residents. '' 38  It was
further noted that in New York, which
has no residence requirement, only 1.8
percent of the welfare recipients in 1955
and 1.5 percent in 1960 had resided in
the state for less than one year, and,
furthermore, only 18 percent of the 1955
group needed assistance over an extended
period of time. 9 Another study further
developed these statistics and found that
when the 18 percent of this 1955 group
were multiplied over a ten year period
and added to the 1.8 percent coming in
each year, there resulted a total increase
exceeding 5 percent in an eleven year
period.40 In other words, at the end of
a ten year period, only 3.2 percent of all
the people on welfare aid are those who
could be hypothesized to have entered
merely to take advantage of the liberal
rules.
Another important question arising from
the instant case is whether or not it will
influence the various other statutes
which include residency requirements as
means of governmental control. Examples
of such statutes include residence require-
ments for the receipt of scholarship loans,
aid in the schooling of blind children,
holding of a liquor permit, and employ-
ment in the state merit system.4'1  The
multitude of these state statutes establish-
ing a residency requirement differ from
38 LoGatto, Residence Laws-A Step Forward
or Backward?, 7 CATHOLIC LAW. 101, 106
(1961).
31Id. at 107.
40 Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence
Tests for General and Categorical Assistance
Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567, 617 (1966).
4 1 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331,
340 (D. Conn. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
the welfare laws only in the type of
service provided by the state. However,
the type of service offered may have a
large bearing on the purpose of the pro-
gram. As a result, a classification based
on length of residence may be reasonably
related to the purpose of legislation.
Therefore, under the reasoning of the
Court in applying the equal protection
clause in the instant case, it would be
necessary in each case to determine the
purpose of the statute and whether the
classification set up by the law is reason-
ably related to that purpose.
These recent cases holding a statutory
residence requirement for receipt of wel-
fare benefits unconstitutional may exert
some influence on cases involving statutes
which merely distinguish between, rather
than classify, residents and nonresidents.
This influence might best be seen in the
case of American Commuters Associa-
tion, Inc. v. Levitt,42 presently being
heard in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.
Plaintiffs in this class action are members
of a New Jersey corporation and reside
in New Jersey and Connecticut but earn
substantially all of their income in New
York. The action seeks a declaration that
the New York income and earnings taxes
are unconstitutional and an injunction
against their enforcement. Plaintiffs' con-
tention is that, although they paid the
taxes, they were refused many of the
benefits due to the fact that they were
42 Docket Number 67 Civil 2534; Defendant's
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plain-
tiffs' Motion to Convene a Three-Judge Court
on file with St. John's Law Review.
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nonresidents. In particular, one of the
plaintiffs was denied admission and a
scholarship to the State University
of New York and was denied a state-
supported student loan by the Bankers
Trust Company. Another was denied
admission to the Bronx High School of
Science, another was forced to pay a
higher fee for a New York fishing license,
and a third was denied welfare and
Medicaid benefits. Plaintiffs claim that the
state, by imposing the taxes but denying
certain benefits, has violated the equal
protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment and the privileges
and immunities clause of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2, of the United States Constitution.
In support of their argument with regard
to the fourteenth amendment, plaintiffs
have relied on the Thompson case, which
held unconstitutional the Connecticut
residency requirement for welfare assist-
ance, while the defendant cited Harrell.
A very important factor to be kept in
mind is that the statute upheld in Harrell
was enacted by the Congress, while the
laws involved in the Green and Thomp-
son cases were passed by state legisla-
tures. As noted earlier, Congress has the
exclusive authority to regulate interstate
commerce so that it has the power to
pass certain laws which would be invalid
if enacted by the states. Nevertheless, it
would seem that the American Com-
muters Association has misplaced its
reliance on the Thompson decision. That
case, like Green, merely invalidated
a statute which established a residency
requirement, not a restriction that state
benefits would be confined to residents.
It would seem that plaintiffs' claim in the
pending New York action might best be
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supported on the theory of the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV,
section 2, which outlaws discrimination
by one state against citizens of another.
The questions raised by the case fall more
within the 'scope of the decisions in
Ward, McCready, Toomer, and Blake,
rather than Thompson and Green. Under
the former cases it would appear that a
proper ratio must be established between
the percentage of taxes paid and the
benefits received. However, unlike the
earlier cases, we are here involved not
with privileges and immunities that arise
from United States citizenship but those
that are specifically provided by a par-
ticular state for its own citizens.
The fundamental significance of the
instant case is in the fact that it estab-
lished a workable test to be used when
applying the equal protection clause of
Applicability of Sixth Amendment
Guarantees to Military Proceedings
Defendant appealed from an order of
the United States District Court of Kan-
sas dismissing his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus which had been brought
on the grounds that, at his special court-
martial, he had been denied his sixth
and fifth amendment guarantees as well
as those of military due process in that
he was assigned a non-legally trained of-
ficer in response to his request for quali-
the fourteenth amendment to constitu-
tional challenges against residency re-
quirements for welfare benefits. The
classification and purpose of the statute
are now to be investigated. Such a test
appears to validly protect the rights of the
individual because, if properly applied,
the actual intent of an applicant will be
investigated before any decision as to the
availability of benefits is determined.
However, the problem which remains is
whether or not the state may validly
restrict aid to its own domiciliaries. In
light of the greater burdens that are now
being placed upon state treasuries to
provide adequate services to residents of
a particular state, it would seem that a
legitimate requirement may be legislated,
i.e., one which reasonably protects the
state against the fraud of an applicant
but legitimately balances against this the
true intent of the individual.
fled counsel.' The United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in affirming
the dismissal of the petition, held that
the defendant's sixth amendment rights
had not been denied since the crime for
which the accused had been charged was
equivalent to a misdemeanor at civil law
and the sixth amendment's assistance of
counsel provision had not, as yet, been
1 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964) (Article 27(c)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ]).
